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Abstract. HMAC DRBG is a deterministic random bit generator us-
ing HMAC speci¯ed in NIST SP 800-90. The document claims that
HMAC DRBG is a pseudorandom bit generator if HMAC is a pseudoran-
dom function. However, no proof is given in the document. This article
provides a security analysis of HMAC DRBG and con¯rms the claim.
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1 Introduction
Background. Random bits are indispensable to every cryptographic application.
However, it is not easy to prepare su±cient amount of truly random bits in
general. Thus, most applications use a cryptographic mechanism that is called
a pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG). It stretches a short sequence of random
bits to a long sequence of bits that are indistinguishable from truly random bits
in practice.
HMAC DRBG is a deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) speci¯ed in
NIST SP 800-90 [3]. It is claimed in NIST SP 800-90 that HMAC DRBG is a
PRBG if HMAC is a pseudorandom function (PRF). However, no proof is made
public as far as the authors know.
Contribution. This article presents a security analysis of HMAC DRBG. The
result supports the claim in NIST SP 800-90 mentioned above. This article does
not provide new techniques and just uses well-known ones in the analysis. In spite
of this fact, the contribution of this paper is still important since HMAC DRBG
is expected to be widely used in practice.
HMAC DRBG consists of three algorithms. They are instantiate, reseed and
generate algorithms. The instantiate/reseed algorithm is used to produce/refresh
a secret key. The generate algorithm produces a binary sequence from a secret
key given by the instantiate or reseed algorithms. This article gives a proof for the
pseudorandomness of HMAC DRBG on the assumption that the instantiate and
reseed algorithms are ideal. Namely, a secret key given to the generate algorithm
is selected uniformly at random by each of them.
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Related Work. NIST SP 800-90 speci¯es four DRBG mechanisms: Hash DRBG,
HMAC DRBG, CTR DRBG and Dual EC DRBG. Hash DRBG and HMAC DRBG
are based on hash functions. CTR DRBG uses a block cipher in the counter
mode. Dual EC DRBG is based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
A security analysis of these DRBGs was presented in [9]. However, the discussion
was quite informal. A security analysis of CTR DRBG was also presented in [7].
Brown and Gj¿steen [6] provided a detailed security analysis of Dual EC DRBG.
There also exist some other approved DRBGs in ANSI X.9.31 [2], ANSI
X.9.62-1998 [1] and FIPS PUB 186-2 [11]. The security of these algorithms was
discussed in [8] and [10].
HMAC was proposed by Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [5]. It was proved to
be a PRF on the assumption that the compression function of the underlying
iterated hash function is a PRF with two keying strategies[4]. Actually, HMAC
is used as a PRF in many cryptographic schemes.
Organization. This article is organized as follows. De¯nitions of a pseudorandom
bit generator and a pseudorandom function are given in Sect. 2. A description of
HMAC DRBG is presented in Sect. 3. Results on security analysis of HMAC DRBG
are shown in Sect. 4. Concluding remarks are given in Sect. 5.
2 Preliminaries
Let a $Ã A represent that an element a is selected uniformly at random from a
set A.
2.1 A Pseudorandom Bit Generator
Let G be a function such that G : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gl. Let D be a probabilistic
algorithm which outputs 0 or 1 for a given input in f0; 1gl. The goal of D is
to tell whether a given input is G(k) for k selected uniformly at random or it
is selected uniformly at random. The advantage of D against G is de¯ned as
follows:
AdvprbgG (D) =
¯¯¯
Pr[D(G(k)) = 1 j k $Ã f0; 1gn]¡ Pr[D(s) = 1 j s $Ã f0; 1gl]
¯¯¯
;
where the probabilities are taken over the coin tosses by D and the uniform
distributions on f0; 1gn or f0; 1gl. G is called a pseudorandom bit generator
(PRBG) if l > n and AdvprbgG (D) is negligible for any e±cient D.
2.2 A Pseudorandom Function
LetH be a keyed function such thatH : K£D ! R, whereK is a key space,D is
a domain, and R is a range. H(k; ¢) is denoted by Hk(¢). Let A be a probabilistic
algorithm which has oracle access to a function from D to R. The goal of A is
to tell whether the oracle is Hk for k selected uniformly at random or it is a
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function selected uniformly at random. A ¯rst asks elements in D and obtains
the corresponding elements in R with respect to the function, and then outputs
0 or 1. A makes the queries adaptively: A makes a new query after receiving an
answer to the current query.
Let F be the set of all functions from D to R. The advantage of A for H is
de¯ned as follows:
AdvprfH (A) =
¯¯¯
Pr[AHk = 1 j k $Ã K]¡ Pr[A½ = 1 j ½ $Ã F ]
¯¯¯
;
where the probabilities are taken over the coin tosses by A and the uniform dis-
tributions on K or F . H is called a pseudorandom function (PRF) if AdvprfH (A)
is negligible for any e±cient A.
3 HMAC DRBG
HMAC DRBG is a DRBG using HMAC in NIST SP 800-90 [3]. It consists of
three algorithms: an instantiate algorithm, a reseed algorithm and a generate
algorithm. The instantiate algorithm is used to produce a secret key. The reseed
algorithm is used to refresh it. These algorithms are out of the scope of the
article. They also use HMAC to produce the secret keys. However, the security
of the outputs is not based on the secrecy and randomness of the keys given to
HMAC but the data given to HMAC via message input. From this viewpoint,
we may say that they abuse HMAC.
We only assume that the keys produced by the instantiate and reseed al-
gorithms are ideal. Namely, we assume that a secret key given to the generate
algorithm is selected uniformly at random.
The generate algorithm produces a binary sequence for a given secret key. A
description of this algorithm is given in the following part. The instantiate and
reseed algorithms are given in Appendix A for reference.
Notation. HMAC is simply denoted by H. Let n denote the output length of H.
Let null denote an empty sequence. Concatenation of binary sequences x and y
is denoted by xky. The symbol k is sometimes omitted.
3.1 Internal State
The internal state of HMAC DRBG includes K 2 f0; 1gn, V 2 f0; 1gn, and a
reseed counter d ¸ 1. K and V are assumed to be secret. The reseed counter d
is an integer variable indicating the number of requests for pseudorandom bits
since instantiation or reseeding.
3.2 The Function Update
The function Update is used in the generate algorithm to produce a secret key
(K;V ) for the next invocation of the generate algorithm. It is described as fol-
lows.
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Update(K, V , adin):
1. K = H(K;V k0x00kadin)
2. V = H(K;V )
3. If adin = null, then return (K;V )
4. K = H(K;V k0x01kadin)
5. V = H(K;V )
6. Return (K;V )
adin is an optional additional input. Update is shown in Fig. 1.
V
K
0x00
K
V
H
H
(a) If adin is an empty sequence
V
K
0x00 adin
0x01 adin
K
V
H
H
H
H
(b) If adin is not an empty sequence
Fig. 1. The function Update
3.3 The Algorithm Generate
The generate algorithm Generate produces a binary sequence s for given secret
(K;V ) and an optional additional input adin. It is described as follows.
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Generate(K, V , adin):
1. If d > w, then return an indication that a reseed is required.
2. (K;V ) = Update(K;V; adin) if adin 6= null
3. tmp = null
4. While jtmpj < ` do:
(a) V = H(K;V )
(b) tmp = tmpkV
5. s = the leftmost ` bits of tmp
6. (K;V ) = Update(K;V; adin)
7. d = d+ 1
8. Return s and (K;V )
The maximum sizes of parameters are given in Table 1. w is called a re-
seed interval. It represents the total number of requests for pseudorandom bits
between reseeding. If adin is not supported, then the step 6 is executed with
adin = null. Generate is given in Fig. 2.
V
K
Update
V
K
null
s
H H H
(a) If adin is not given or not supported
V
K
Update
V
K
Update
adin
s
H H H
(b) If adin is given
Fig. 2. The algorithm Generate. The update of the reseed counter d is omitted.
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Table 1. The maximum sizes of parameters
parameter maximum size
jadinj 235 bits
` 219 bits
w 248
4 Security Analysis
For simplicity, we assume that ` is a multiple of n. Thus, the output length of
Generate is `+2n. We analyze the security of a generator G : f0; 1g2n ! f0; 1gw`
de¯ned as follows:
G(K;V ):
1. (K0; V0) = (K;V )
2. s = null
3. for i = 1 to w do
(a) (si;Ki; Vi) = Generate(Ki¡1; Vi¡1; adini¡1)
(b) s = sksi
(c) Return s
We make adini implicit in the notation of G(K;V ), because the analysis given
in the remaining parts does not depend on the value of adini. It depends only
on whether adini = null or not.
4.1 If adin = null
First, notice that we cannot prove the pseudorandomness of G directly from
that of Generate. Generate is not a PRBG if adin = null. Let q = `=n and
Generate(K;V ) = s1ks2k ¢ ¢ ¢ ksqkK 0kV 0, where sj 2 f0; 1gn for 1 · j · q. Then,
V 0 = HK0(sq). Thus, it is easy to distinguish s1ks2k ¢ ¢ ¢ ksqkK 0kV 0 from a truly
random sequence of length `+ 2n.
We introduce two generators G01 and G02. G01 : f0; 1g2n ! f0; 1g`+2n is
described as follows:
G01(K;V ):
1. s = V
2. tmp = null
3. While jtmpj < ` do:
(a) V = H(K;V )
(b) tmp = tmpkV
4. s = sktmp
5. K = H(K;V k0x00)
6. s = skK
7. Return s
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G02 : f0; 1g2n ! f0; 1g`+3n is described as follows:
G02(K;V ) :
1. s = V
2. V = H(K;V )
3. s = skG01(K;V )
4. Return s
The only di®erence between G01 and G02 is that G02 calls HMAC more than
G01 by one time.
Let G0 : f0; 1g2n ! f0; 1gw(`+n)+n be a generator which, for a given (K;V ),
produces a sequence½
s10s
1
1 ¢ ¢ ¢ s1q+1 if w = 1
s10s
1
1 ¢ ¢ ¢ s1q¡1ks2¡1s20 ¢ ¢ ¢ s2q¡1k ¢ ¢ ¢ ksw¡1¡1 sw¡10 ¢ ¢ ¢ sw¡1q¡1 ksw¡1sw0 ¢ ¢ ¢ swq+1 if w ¸ 2 ;
where
1. sij 2 f0; 1gn,
2. s10s
1
1 ¢ ¢ ¢ s1q+1 = G01(K;V ), and
3. si¡1s
i
0s
i
1 ¢ ¢ ¢ siq+1 = G02(si¡1q+1; si¡1q ) for 2 · i · w.
A diagram of G0 is given in Fig. 3. Notice that G(K;V ) is a part of G0(K;V ).
It is obvious if w = 1. For w ¸ 2,
G(K;V )
= s11s
1
2 ¢ ¢ ¢ s1q¡1ks2¡1s21s22 ¢ ¢ ¢ s2q¡1k ¢ ¢ ¢ ksw¡1¡1 sw¡11 sw¡12 ¢ ¢ ¢ sw¡1q¡1 ksw¡1sw1 sw2 ¢ ¢ ¢ swq
= s11s
1
2 ¢ ¢ ¢ s1qks21s22 ¢ ¢ ¢ s2qk ¢ ¢ ¢ ksw¡11 sw¡12 ¢ ¢ ¢ sw¡1q ksw1 sw2 ¢ ¢ ¢ swq ;
where si+1¡1 = s
i
q for 1 · i · w ¡ 1. Thus, G is a PRBG if G0 is a PRBG. We
will discuss the security of G0 in the remaining part.
c c
V
K
G01 G02 G02 G02
. . . . . . . . . . . .
V
K
H H H H
H
H
H
Fig. 3. A diagram of the generator G0. c represents the concatenation with 0x00. The
Update functions are surrounded by dashed rectangles.
We ¯rst show that both G01 and G02 are PRBGs if HMAC is a PRF. For an
algorithm A, let tA be the running time of A.
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Lemma 1. Let D be a distinguisher for G01 which runs in tD. Then, there exists
an adversary A for HMAC such that
AdvprbgG01 (D) · Adv
prf
HMAC(A) +
q(q ¡ 1)
2n+1
:
A runs in tD +O(`) and asks at most q + 1 queries.
Proof. Let F¤;n be the set of all functions from f0; 1g¤ to f0; 1gn. Let G^01(½; ¢)
be a generator obtained from G01 by replacing HMAC with a function ½ 2 F¤;n.
Let
P0 = Pr[D(s) = 1 j (K;V ) $Ã f0; 1g2n ^ sÃ G01(K;V )] ;
P1 = Pr[D(s) = 1 j ½ $Ã F¤;n ^ V $Ã f0; 1gn ^ sÃ G^01(½; V )] ;
P2 = Pr[D(s) = 1 j s $Ã f0; 1g`+2n] :
Then,
AdvprbgG (D) = jP0 ¡ P2j · jP0 ¡ P1j+ jP1 ¡ P2j :
Let G^01(½; V ) = s^0s^1 ¢ ¢ ¢ s^q+1, where s^j 2 f0; 1gn for 0 · j · q + 1. If
½
$Ã F¤;n, then G^01(½; V ) and a random sequence of length `+2n is completely
indistinguishable as far as s^j1 6= s^j2 for every j1 and j2 such that 0 · j1 < j2 ·
q ¡ 1. Notice that s^j 6= s^qk0x00 for every 0 · j · q ¡ 1. Thus,
jP1 ¡ P2j · q(q ¡ 1)2n+1 :
On the other hand, for jP0 ¡ P1j, it is easy to see that we can construct an
adversary A for HMAC, using D as a subroutine, such that
AdvprfHMAC(A) ¸ jP0 ¡ P1j ;
where A runs in tD +O(`) and asks at most q + 1 queries. ut
Lemma 2. Let D be a distinguisher for G02 which runs in tD. Then, there exists
an adversary A such that
AdvprbgG02 (D) · Adv
prf
HMAC(A) +
q(q + 1)
2n+1
:
A runs in tD +O(`) and asks at most q + 2 queries.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. ut
For w ¸ 2, let G(w¡1)02 be a generator which calls G02 (w ¡ 1) times succes-
sively. Namely,
G
(w¡1)
02 (s
1
q+1; s
1
q) = s
2
¡1s
2
0 ¢ ¢ ¢ s2q¡1k ¢ ¢ ¢ ksw¡1¡1 sw¡10 ¢ ¢ ¢ sw¡1q¡1 ksw¡1sw0 ¢ ¢ ¢ swq+1 :
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Lemma 3. Let D be a distinguisher for G(w¡1)02 which runs in tD. Then, there
exists a distinguisher D0 of G02 such that
Advprbg
G
(w¡1)
02
(D) · (w ¡ 1)AdvprbgG02 (D0) :
D0 runs in tD + (w ¡ 2) tG02 +O(w`).
Proof. For a given input s 2 f0; 1g`+3n, the distinguisher D0 behaves as follows:
1. Select 2 · r · w uniformly at random.
2. If r ¸ 3, then select s2¡1s20 ¢ ¢ ¢ s2q¡1; : : : ; sr¡1¡1 sr¡10 ¢ ¢ ¢ sr¡1q¡1 uniformly at ran-
dom.
3. Let sr¡1s
r
0 ¢ ¢ ¢ srq+1 = s.
4. If r < w, si¡1s
i
0 ¢ ¢ ¢ siq+1 = G02(si¡1q+1; si¡1q ) for r + 1 · i · w.
5. Call D with
s = s2¡1s
2
0 ¢ ¢ ¢ s2q¡1k ¢ ¢ ¢ ksw¡1¡1 sw¡10 ¢ ¢ ¢ sw¡1q¡1 ksw¡1sw0 ¢ ¢ ¢ swq+1 :
6. Output D's output.
Then,
AdvprbgG02 (D0)
=
¯¯¯
Pr[D0(G02(K;V )) = 1 j (K;V ) $Ã f0; 1g2n]¡ Pr[D0(s) = 1 j s $Ã f0; 1g`+3n]
¯¯¯
=
¯¯¯
Pr[D(s) = 1 j (K;V ) $Ã f0; 1g2n ^ sÃ G02(K;V )]
¡ Pr[D(s) = 1 j s $Ã f0; 1g`+3n]
¯¯¯
:
Pr[D(s) = 1 j (K;V ) $Ã f0; 1g2n ^ sÃ G02(K;V )]
=
wX
u=2
Pr[r = u ^ D(s) = 1 j (K;V ) $Ã f0; 1g2n ^ sÃ G02(K;V )]
=
wX
u=2
Pr[D(s) = 1 j (K;V ) $Ã f0; 1g2n ^ sÃ G02(K;V ) ^ r = u]
w ¡ 1
=
Pr[D(s) = 1 j (K;V ) $Ã f0; 1g2n ^ sÃ G(w¡1)02 (K;V )]
w ¡ 1 +
wX
u=3
Pr[D(s) = 1 j (K;V ) $Ã f0; 1g2n ^ sÃ G02(K;V ) ^ r = u]
w ¡ 1 :
Pr[D(s) = 1 j s $Ã f0; 1g`+3n] =
w¡1X
u=2
Pr[D(s) = 1 j s $Ã f0; 1g`+3n ^ r = u]
w ¡ 1
+
Pr[D(s) = 1 j s $Ã f0; 1g(w¡1)(`+n)+2n]
w ¡ 1 :
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There may exist a better distinguisher for G02 than D0 with the same running
time. Thus, we have
AdvprbgG02 (D0) ¸
1
w ¡ 1Adv
prbg
G
(w¡1)
02
(D) :
The running time of D0 is at most tD + (w ¡ 2) tG02 +O(w`). ut
Lemma 4. Let D be a distinguisher for G0 which runs in tD. Then, there exist
distinguishers D0 for G01 and D00 for G(w¡1)02 such that
AdvprbgG0 (D) · Adv
prbg
G01
(D0) + Advprbg
G
(w¡1)
02
(D00) :
D0 runs in tD + tG(w¡1)02 +O(w`), and D
00 runs in tD +O(w`).
Proof. Let
P0 = Pr[D(s) = 1 j (K;V ) $Ã f0; 1g2n ^ sÃ G0(K;V )] ;
P1 = Pr[D(s) = 1 j s10 ¢ ¢ ¢ s1q+1 $Ã f0; 1g`+2n ^ sÃ s10 ¢ ¢ ¢ s1q¡1kG(w¡1)02 (s1q+1; s1q)] ;
P2 = Pr[D(s) = 1 j s $Ã f0; 1gw(`+n)+n] :
Then, there exist D0 and D00 such that
AdvprbgG0 (D) = jP0 ¡ P2j · jP0 ¡ P1j+ jP1 ¡ P2j
· AdvprbgG01 (D0) + Adv
prbg
G
(w¡1)
02
(D00) :
The running time of D0 is tD + tG(w¡1)02 + O(w`). The running time of D
00 is
tD +O(w`). ut
The following theorem directly follows from Lemmas 1, 2, 3 and 4. It implies
that G0 is a PRBG if HMAC is a PRF.
Theorem 1. Let D be a distinguisher for G0 which runs in tD. Then, there
exists an adversary A for HMAC such that
AdvprbgG0 (D) · wAdv
prf
HMAC(A) +
wq(q + 1)
2n+1
:
A runs in tD + w(q + 2) tHMAC + O(w`) and asks at most q + 2 queries, where
the length of each query is at most n+ 8.
Remark 1. Suppose that SHA-1 is the underlying hash function of HMAC. Then,
n = 160. Suppose that w = 248 and ` = 211 £ 160 (· 219). Then,
AdvprbgG0 (D) · 248Adv
prf
HMAC(A) +
1
290
;
where A runs in time tD+260 tHMAC+O(266:3) and makes at most 2050 queries.
The big-O notation is abused here. O(266:3) is upper bounded by c £ 266:3 for
some positive constant c.
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Remark 2. Suppose that SHA-256 is the underlying hash function of HMAC.
Then, n = 256. Suppose that w = 248 and ` = 219. Then,
AdvprbgG0 (D) · 248Adv
prf
HMAC(A) +
1
2186
;
where A runs in time tD + 260tHMAC +O(267) and makes at most 2050 queries.
4.2 If adin 6= null
If adin 6= null, then the analysis is similar but tedious. We ¯rst de¯ne several
generators.
Let g10 : f0; 1g2n ! f0; 1g2n be a generator such that
g10(K;V ) = V kH(K;V k0x00kadin) :
Let g11 : f0; 1g2n ! f0; 1g3n be a generator such that g11(K;V ) = s, where s is
obtained as follows:
1. V1 = H(K;V )
2. V2 = H(K;V1k0x01kadin)
3. s = V kV1kV2
Let g12 : f0; 1g2n ! f0; 1g3n be a generator such that g12(K;V ) = s, where s is
obtained as follows:
1. V1 = H(K;V )
2. V2 = H(K;V1k0x00kadin)
3. s = V kV1kV2
The generators g10, g11 and g12 are depicted in Fig. 4.
Let G10 : f0; 1g2n ! f0; 1g`+3n be a generator equivalent to G02 de¯ned in
the previous subsection.
c0
H
H
H
Hc1 c0 H
g10 g11 g12
Fig. 4. A diagram of the generators g10, g11 and g12. The Update functions are sur-
rounded by dashed rectangles. c0 represents the concatenation with 0x00kadin, and c1
represents the concatenation with 0x01kadin.
Using the generators de¯ned above, we further de¯ne two generators G11
and G12. G11 : f0; 1g2n ! f0; 1g`+4n is described as follows: G11(K;V ) =
s¡2s¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ sq+1, where
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1. V1K1 = g10(K;V )
2. s¡2V2K2 = g11(K1; V1)
3. s¡1s0 ¢ ¢ ¢ sqsq+1 = G10(K2; V2)
G12 : f0; 1g2n ! f0; 1g`+6n is described as follows: G12(K;V ) = s¡4s¡3 ¢ ¢ ¢ sq+1,
where
1. s¡4V1K1 = g11(K;V )
2. s¡3V2K2 = g12(K1; V1)
3. s¡2V3K3 = g11(K2; V2)
4. s¡1s0 ¢ ¢ ¢ sqsq+1 = G10(K3; V3)
Now, we are ready to discuss the pseudorandomness of G(K;V ). Let G1 :
f0; 1g2n ! f0; 1gw(`+4n) be a generator which, for a given (K;V ), produces a
sequence½
s1¡2s
1
¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ s1q+1 if w = 1
s1¡2s
1
¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ s1q¡1ks2¡4 ¢ ¢ ¢ s2q¡1k ¢ ¢ ¢ ksw¡1¡4 ¢ ¢ ¢ sw¡1q¡1 ksw¡4 ¢ ¢ ¢ swq+1 if w ¸ 2 ;
where
1. sij 2 f0; 1gn,
2. s1¡2s
1
¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ s1q+1 = G11(K;V ), and
3. si¡4 ¢ ¢ ¢ siq+1 = G12(si¡1q+1; si¡1q ) for 2 · i · w.
Notice that G(K;V ) is a part of G1(K;V ). It is easy to see if w = 1. For w ¸ 2,
G(K;V )
= s11s
1
2 ¢ ¢ ¢ s1q¡1ks2¡4s21s22 ¢ ¢ ¢ s2q¡1k ¢ ¢ ¢ ksw¡1¡4 sw¡11 sw¡12 ¢ ¢ ¢ sw¡1q¡1 ksw¡4sw1 sw2 ¢ ¢ ¢ swq+1
= s11s
1
2 ¢ ¢ ¢ s1qks21s22 ¢ ¢ ¢ s2qk ¢ ¢ ¢ ksw¡11 sw¡12 ¢ ¢ ¢ sw¡1q ksw1 sw2 ¢ ¢ ¢ swq ;
where si+1¡4 = s
i
q for 1 · i · w¡1. Thus, we discuss the pseudorandomness of G1
in the remaining part. We only present the results since the proofs are similar.
Lemma 5. Let D be a distinguisher for g10 which runs in tD. Then, there exists
an adversary A for HMAC such that
Advprbgg10 (D) · AdvprfHMAC(A) :
A runs in tD +O(n) and asks 1 query.
Lemma 6. Let g be g11 or g12. Let D be a distinguisher for g which runs in tD.
Then, there exists an adversary A for HMAC such that
Advprbgg (D) · AdvprfHMAC(A) :
A runs in tD +O(n) and asks at most 2 queries.
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Lemma 7. Let D be a distinguisher for G11 which runs in tD. Then, there exist
D0, D1 and D0 such that
AdvprbgG11 (D) · Advprbgg10 (D0) + Advprbgg11 (D1) + Adv
prbg
G10
(D0) :
D0 runs in tD + tg11 + tG10 + O(n). D1 runs in tD + tG10 + O(n). D0 runs in
tD +O(n).
Lemma 8. Let D be a distinguisher for G12 which runs in tD. Then, there exist
D1, D2 and D0 such that
AdvprbgG12 (D) · 2Advprbgg11 (D1) + Advprbgg12 (D2) + Adv
prbg
G10
(D0) :
D1 runs in tD + tg11 + tg12 + tG10 + O(n). D2 runs in tD + tg11 + tG10 + O(n).
D0 runs in tD +O(n).
The following theorem directly follows from Lemmas 5, 6, 7 and 8. It implies
that G1 is a PRBG if HMAC is a pseudorandom function.
Theorem 2. Let D be a distinguisher for G1 which runs in tD. Then, there
exist adversaries A1 and A2 such that
AdvprbgG1 (D) · wAdv
prf
HMAC(A1) + 3wAdvprfHMAC(A2) +
wq(q ¡ 1)
2n+1
:
A1 runs in tD + w(q + 8) tHMAC + O(w`) and asks at most q + 1 queries, and
A2 runs in tD + (w + 1)(q + 8) tHMAC +O(w`) and asks at most 2 queries.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the binary sequence generation algorithm of HMAC DRBG
is a PRBG if HMAC is a PRF. Future work includes analysis of the instantiate
and reseed algorithms of HMAC DRBG.
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A The Instantiate and Reseed Algorithms of
HMAC DRBG
The internal state of HMAC DRBG includes K 2 f0; 1gn, V 2 f0; 1gn, and
a reseed counter d. data is the entropy source. adin is an optional additional
input.
The Instantiate Algorithm. The instantiate algorithm Instantiate is described as
follows:
Instantiate(data; nonce; adin):
1. seed = dataknoncekadin
2. K = 0x0000 ¢ ¢ ¢ 00
3. V = 0x0101 ¢ ¢ ¢ 01
4. (K;V ) = Update(seed;K; V )
5. d = 1
6. Return (K;V ) and d.
If adin is not supported, then the ¯rst step of the procedure is replaced by
seed = dataknonce :
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The Reseed Algorithm. The reseed algorithm Reseed is described as follows:
Reseed(K;V; d; data; adin):
1. seed = datakadin
2. (K;V ) = Update(seed;K; V )
3. d = 1
4. Return (K;V ) and d.
The input (K;V ) to Reseed is given by the latest Generate. If adin is not sup-
ported, then the ¯rst step of the procedure is replaced by
seed = data :
